Sandra Peterson, “Xenophon’s Socrates on Just and Lawful in Memorabilia IV. 4″
Several scholars say that Xenophon’s Socrates gives definitions of moral virtues, while Plato’s Socrates (in the so-termed ‘Socratic’ or ‘early’ dialogues) seeks, but fails, to find such. If Xenophon’s Socrates succeeds where Plato’s Socrates fails, the one Socrates would be quite different from the other.
Memorabilia IV.4. 5-25 has been proposed as evidence that Xenophon’s Socrates in conversation with Hippias defines the just as the lawful.
This essay proposes that the conversation of Memorabilia IV. 4. 5-25 is in fact no evidence that Xenophon’s Socrates intends to give his definition of anything.
The strategy of my essay is to argue, solely from some language and structural features of the conversation, that Xenophon intends to depict that the type of conversation of Socrates and Hippias in IV.4. is combative dialegesthai. Combative discussants aim only to outwit each other, not to show their own convictions.
The small result I can claim for this essay, if successful, is that this one passage, Mem. IV. 4. 5-25, provides no evidence that Xenophon’s Socrates differs from Plato’s Socrates in ability to define ethical terms. (I have arguments against the evidential value of other passages that have been cited as evidence that Xenophon’s Socrates has such definitions, but I do not go into those here for lack of time. Each passage requires new and unique treatment.)
My tiny project for this talk would be a much tinier part –by an informal calculation 1/188th— of a larger project of arguing, in opposition to some scholars, that Xenophon’s Socrates is the same as Plato’s in some most important, not merely superficial, ways. I nevertheless grant that Xenophon’s selective presentation of Socrates differs from Plato’s selective presentation.