Julia Annas: Socratic Intellectualism

This talk contributes two thoughts which, I hope, will help to shift the burden of proof in favor of those who fail to find any form of ‘Socratic intellectualism’ in Plato’s works. The first concerns methodology and the second looks at some texts.

First thought: let’s consider the implications of taking seriously, as did the Academic Skeptics, the point that Socratic argument is always (not just in one group of dialogues) from the interlocutor’s position, not from a position that he himself argues to, or argues from. Socrates is not replacing the interlocutor’s position with one of his own, but stirring him up to think further for himself. This is scarcely a new point, but has not been taken seriously enough in relation to the idea that Socrates himself is committed to ‘Socratic intellectualism’.

Second thought: if we look at some passages in the ‘Socratic’ dialogues, and in the Republic, we can see that it is reasonable to think that Plato always held the view, standard for his time, that virtue requires us to have both a rational element, capable of understanding, and a non-rational element which is educable by the rational element (directly or indirectly). Why then is it the understanding aspect which is the focus of Socrates’ questioning in the ‘Socratic’ dialogues? I have a suggestion.