Abstract:

In many instances in the dialogues, Socrates urges us to get rid of a sense of reserve or shame that could be detrimental to research. From an epistemological requirement (shame should not obscure research, either in its exercise or in relation to some of its objects), one could draw the idea that Socrates has certain features of Cynic impudence (anaideia). However, there are at least two dialogues where Socrates reveals a deep sense of shame and respect: in the Symposium, through Alcibiades’ account of Socrates’ courageous and moderate behaviour, and in the Phaedrus, where Plato seems to pick up a dramatic pattern of Sappho’s fr. 137 in Socrates’ two speeches, first speaking with his head hooded, then revealing himself (impudently?) to Phaedrus before his palinody. The question we would like to explore in this paper is: does Socrates’ aidôs, if it exists, constitute a model of virtue? To the impudent and altogether respectful Socrates, one would then have to compare the Platonic nuanced analysis according to which aidôs is, if not a virtue, at least a disposition that should be cultivated in citizens.