Voula Tsouna, “The Argument from Benefit in the Charmides”

In the Charmides,  Critias defines temperance as an epistêmê (‘science’) whose only object is epistêmê itself; and he strongly suggests that the benefits of temperance derive precisely from its reflexive character.  The famous Argument from Benefit (169d2-175a8) at the end of the dialogue aims to answer the question whether or not such a ‘science of science’ would be good for us, if it is at all possible.

The Argument from Benefit is enormously challenging, first of all because it appears prima facie to refute an intellectualist position close to Socrates’ own heart.  It is also a very complex and difficult argument that has no close parallel in the so-called Socratic dialogues of Plato.  In this paper I shall propose a new reading of the argument as a reductio which progresses in five successive steps and constitutes a devastating attack against Critias’ conception of temperance.  I shall argue that, by refuting the idea that temperance as a ‘science of science’ can have epistemic content, Socrates demolishes Critias’ vision of a society governed on the basis of a science revolving solely around itself, obsessed with specialisation and productivity, but lacking the values that could ensure the happiness of individuals and of the city.